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Abstract
In this paper we prove a sufficient maximum principle for general stochastic differential
Stackelberg games, and apply the theory to continuous time newsvendor problems. In the
newsvendor problem a manufacturer sells goods to a retailer, and the objective of both
parties is to maximize expected profits under a random demand rate. Our demand rate is
an Itoˆ-Le´vy process, and to increase realism information is delayed, e.g., due to production
time. We provide complete existence and uniqueness proofs for a series of special cases,
including geometric Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, both with time
variable coefficients. Moreover, these results are operational because we are able to offer
explicit solution formulas. An interesting finding is that more precise information may be a
considerable disadvantage for the retailer.
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Main variables:
w = wholesale price per unit (chosen by the manufacturer)
q = order quantity (rate chosen by the retailer)
R = retail price per unit (chosen by the retailer)
D = demand (random rate)
M = production cost per unit (fixed)
S = salvage price per unit (fixed)
1 Introduction
The one periodic newsvendor model is a widely studied object that has attracted increasing
interest in the two last decades. The basic setting is that a retailer wants to order a quantity
q from a manufacturer. The demand D is a random variable, and the retailer wishes to select
an order quantity q maximizing his expected profit E[Πr(q,D)]. When the distribution of D is
known, this problem is easily solved. The basic problem is very simple, but appears to have a
never ending number of variations. There is by now a huge literature on such problems, and for
further reading we refer to the survey papers by Cachon (2003) and Qin et. al (2011) and the
numerous references therein.
The (discrete) multiperiod newsvendor problem has been studied in detail by many authors,
Matsuyama (2004), Berling (2006), Bensoussan et. al (2007, 2009), Wang et. al (2010), just
to quote some of the more recent contributions. Two papers that come somewhat close to the
approach used in our paper are Kogan (2003) and Kogan and Lou (2003) , where the authors
consider continuous time scheduling problems.
In many cases the demand is not known and the parties gain information through a sequence
of observations. There is a huge literature on cases with partial information, e.g., Scarf (1958),
Gallego & Moon (1993), Bensoussan et. al (2007), Perakis & Roels (2008), Wang et. al (2010),
just to mention a few. When a sufficiently large number of observations have been made, how-
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ever, the distribution of demand is fully revealed and can be used to optimize order quantities.
This approach only works if the distribution of D is static, and leads to false conclusions if the
demand changes systematically over time. In this paper we will assume that the demand rate
is a stochastic process Dt and we seek optimal decision rules for that case.
In our paper a retailer and a manufacturer write contracts for the size of a delivery rate.
The manufacturer is the leader and decides the wholesale price. Based on the given wholesale
price, the retailer decides the size of the delivery rate. We assume a Stackelberg framework,
and hence ignore cases where the retailer can negotiate the wholesale price. The contract is
written at time t − δ, and goods are received at time t. It is essential to assume that infor-
mation is delayed. If there is no delay, the demand rate is known, and obviously the retailer
puts his order rate equal to the demand rate. Information is delayed by a time δ. One justifica-
tion for this is that production takes time, and orders cannot be placed and effectuated instantly.
Multiperiod newsvendor problems with delayed information have been discussed in several
papers, but none of these papers appears to make the theory operational. Bensoussan el. al
(2009) use a time-discrete approach and generalizes several information delay models, however,
under the assumption of independence of the delay process from the inventory, the demand,
and the ordering process. They write that removing this assumption would give rise to inter-
esting as well as challenging research problems, and that a study of computation of the optimal
base-stock levels and their behavior with respect to problem parameters would be of interest.
Computational issues are not explored in their paper, and they only consider decision problems
for inventory managers, disregarding any game theoretical issues.
Calzolari et. al (2011) discuss filtering of stochastic systems with fixed delay, indicating that
problems with delay leads to non-trivial numerical problems even when the driving process is
Brownian motion. In our paper solutions to general delayed newsvendor equilibria are formulated
in terms of coupled systems of stochastic differential equations. Our approach may hence be
useful also in the general case where closed form solutions cannot be obtained.
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Figure 1 shows a sample path of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which is mean reverting
around a level µ = 100. Even though the long time average is 100, orders based on this average
are clearly suboptimal. At, e.g., t = 30, we observe a demand rate D30 = 157. When the mean
reversion rate is as slow as in Figure 1, the information D30 = 157 increases the odds that the
demand rate is more than 100 at time t = 37. If the delay δ = 7 (days), the retailer should
hence try to exploit this extra information to improve performance.
δ
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Figure 1: An Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with delayed information
Based on the information available at time t− δ, the manufacturer should offer the retailer
a price per unit wt for items delivered at time t. Given the wholesale price wt and all available
information, the retailer should decide on an order rate qt and a retail price Rt. The retail
price can in principle lead to changes in demand, and in general the demand rate Dt is hence
a function of Rt. Such cases are hard to solve in terms of explicit expressions, however, and we
will also look at the simplified case where R is exogenously given and fixed. To carry out our
construction, we will need to assume that items cannot be stored. That is of course a strong
limitation, but applies to important cases like electricity markets and markets for fresh foods.
Assuming that both parties have full information about the demand rate at time t− δ, and
that the manufacturer knows how much the retailer will order at any given unit price w, we
are left with a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the
follower. To our knowledge stochastic differential games of this sort have not previously been
discussed in the literature. Before we can discuss game equilibria for the newsvendor problem, we
must hence formulate and prove a sufficient maximum principle for general stochastic differential
Stackelberg games.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up a framework where we discuss
general stochastic differential Stackelberg games. To keep the discussion simple, we only discuss
the problem in very broad terms. The details are technically demanding, and the complete proof
and formulation of our maximum principle is placed in Appendix A. In Section 3 we discuss a
continuous time newsvendor problem. As the newsvendor problem is a special case of the general
framework in Section 2, the results in Appendix A can be used to formulate explicit strategies for
finding equilibria of such problems. In Section 4 we consider the case where the demand rate is
given by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, and are able to provide explicit solutions for the unique
equilibria that occurs in that case. Section 5 is devoted to geometric Brownian motion, and ex-
plicit solutions are provided for that case as well. The result in the constant coefficient case is
quite startling, as it leads to an equilibrium where the manufacturer offers a constant price w
and the retailer orders a fixed fraction of the observed demand rate. In Section 6 we compare the
dynamic approach with a static approach where both parties (wrongly) believes that the demand
rate has a static distribution. An interesting finding is that more precise information can be a
considerable disadvantage for the retailer. Finally in Section 7 we offer some concluding remarks.
As already mentioned above, parts of the paper are technically demanding. To make the
paper available to a larger public, complete proofs are in most cases placed in the Appen-
dices. Appendix A provides the full details for stochastic differential Stackelberg games, while
Appendix B contains all the rest of the proofs.
2 General stochastic differential Stackelberg games
In this section we will consider general stochastic differential Stackelberg games. In our frame-
work the state of the system is given by a stochastic process Xt. The game has two players.
Player 1 can at time t choose a control u1(t) while player 2 can choose a control u2(t). The
controls determine how Xt evolves in time. We will use bolded characters to denote functions,
e.g., u1 denotes the function u1(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T . The performance for player i is assumed to be on
the form
Ji(u1,u2) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,Xt, u1(t), u2(t))dt+ gi(XT )
]
i = 1, 2 (1)
where f1, f2, g1, g2 are given functions.
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In our Stackelberg game player 1 is the leader, and player 2 the follower. Hence when u1 is
revealed to player 2, player 2 will choose u2 to maximize J2(u1,u2). Player 1 knows that player
2 will act in this rational way.
Suppose that for any given control u1 there exists a map Φ that selects u2 which maximizes
J2(u1,u2). Player 1 will hence choose u1 = u∗1 such that u1 7→ J1(u1,Φ(u1)) is maximal for
u1 = u∗1. In order to solve problems of this type we need to specify how the state of the system
evolves in time. We will work in a framework where Xt is a controlled jump diffusion on the
form
dXt = µ(t,Xt, u1(t), u2(t), ω)dt+ σ(t,Xt, u1(t), u2(t), ω)dBt
+
∫
R
γ(t,Xt, u1(t), u2(t), ξ, ω)N˜(dt, dξ) (2)
X(0) = x ∈ R
where µ, σ, γ are given continuous functions, assumed to be continuously differentiable with re-
spect to the variables X,u1 and u2. More precise definitions are provided in Appendix A. See
also Øksendal and Sulem (2007) for more information about Le´vy processes and controlled jump
diffusions. The framework defined by (2) is very general, and contains among many other things,
important special cases like the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and geometric Brownian motion.
To solve optimization problems related to processes on the form given in (2), one needs to
formulate Hamiltonians and write down and solve the adjoint equations. Anticipating that many
readers are unfamiliar with such optimization methods, these technical parts are discussed in
full detail in Appendix A. At this point it suffices to say that a sufficient maximum principle
can be found. In Section 3 we will consider the particular case of the newsvendor model. This
case is more explicit, and the machinery in Appendix A can be used to make a set of explicit
equations that can be applied without reference to the underlying details in Appendix A. It is
hence possible to understand and analyze large parts of this paper without venturing the depths
of Appendix A.
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3 A continuous time newsvendor problem
In this section we will formulate a continuous time newsvendor problem and use the results in
Appendix A to describe a set of explicit equations that we need to solve to find Stackelberg
equilibria. We will assume that the demand rate for a good is given by a (possibly controlled)
stochastic process Dt. A retailer is at time t − δ offered a unit price wt for items to be de-
livered at time t. Here δ > 0 is the delay time. At time t − δ, the retailer chooses an order
rate qt. The retailer also decides a retail price Rt. We assume that items can be salvaged at
a unit price S ≥ 0, and that items cannot be stored, i.e., they must be sold instantly or salvaged.
Remarks
The delay δ can be interpreted as production time, and it is natural to assume that wt and qt
should both be settled at time t−δ. In general the retail price Rt can be settled at a later stage.
The assumption that items cannot be stored is of course quite restrictive. There are still many
important cases leading to an assumptions of this kind, we mention in particular the electricity
market and markets for fresh foods.
Assuming that sale will take part in the time period δ ≤ t ≤ T , the retailer will get an
expected profit
J2(w,q,R) = E
[∫ T
δ
(Rt − S) min[Dt, qt]− (wt − S)qtdt
]
(3)
When the manufacturer has a fixed production cost per unit M , the manufacturer will get
an expected profit
J1(w,q,R) = E
[∫ T
δ
(wt −M)qtdt
]
(4)
Technical remark
To solve these problems mathematically, it is convenient to apply an equivalent mathematical
formulation: At time t the retailer orders the quantity t for immediate delivery, but the in-
formation at that time is the delayed information Ft−δ about the demand δ units of time ago.
Similarly, when the the manufacturer delivers the ordered quantity qt at time t, the unit price wt
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is based on Ft−δ. From a practical point of view this formulation is of course entirely different,
but leads to the same optimization problem.
3.1 Formalized information
We will assume that our demand rate is given by a (possibly controlled) jump diffusion on the
form:
dDt = µ(t,Dt, Rt)dt+ σ(t,Dt, Rt)dBt +
∫
R
γ(t,Dt, Rt, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); t ∈ [0, T ] (5)
D0 = d0 ∈ R
Brownian motion Bt and the compensated Poisson term N˜(t, dz) are driving the stochastic
differential equation in (5), and it is hence natural to formalize information with respect to
these objects. We hence let Ft denote the σ-algebra generated by Bs and N˜(s, dz), 0 ≤ s ≤ t.
Intuitively Ft contains all the information up to time t. When information is delayed, we instead
consider the σ-algebras
Et := Ft−δ t ∈ [δ, T ] (6)
Both the retailer and the manufacturer should base their actions on the delayed information.
Technically that means that qt and wt should be Et-adapted, i.e., q and w should be E-predictable
processes. In less technical terms E-predictable means that for each t it must be possible to
write down the value based on a limit of functions of the values of the Brownian motion and the
compensated Poisson term at times up to t− δ. As mentioned above, the retail price Rt can be
settled at a later stage. It is hence possible to consider a second delay δR < δ, and assume that
Rt is decided at time t− δR. We hence consider a second σ-algebra ERt := Ft−δR , t ∈ [δ, T ] and
will assume that R is ER-predictable.
3.2 Finding Stackelberg equilibria in the newsvendor model
Using the machinery developed in Appendix A, we can now write down a system of equations
defining Stackelberg equilibria for our newsvendor model. We will focus on the simplified case
where Dt does not depend on the retail price, and where Rt = R is exogeneously given and
fixed. In that particular case the resulting equations are quite transparent and the following
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theorem summarizes the result.
Theorem 3.2.1
Assume that Dt has a continuous distribution, that Dt does not depend on Rt and that Rt = R
is exogenously given and fixed. For any given wt with S < M ≤ wt ≤ R consider the equation
E
[
(R− S)X[0,Dt](qt)− wt + S|Et
]
= 0 (7)
Let qt = φ(wt) denote the unique solution of (7), and assume that the function
wt 7→ E [(wt −M)φ(wt)|Et] (8)
has unique maximum at wt = wˆt. If qˆt = φ(wˆt), then the pair (qˆ, wˆ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium
for the newsvendor problem defined by (4) and (3).
Here X[0,Dt](q) denotes the indicator function for the interval [0, Dt], i.e., a function that has
the value 1 if 0 ≤ q ≤ Dt, and is zero otherwise. To see why (7) always has a unique solution,
note that wt is Et-measurable and hence (7) is equivalent to
E
[X[0,Dt](qt)|Et] = wt − SR− S (9)
Existence and uniqueness of qt then follows from monotonicity of conditional expectation. To
avoid degenerate cases we need to know that Dt has a continuous distribution. In the next
sections we will consider special cases, and we will often be able to write down explicit solutions
to (7) and prove that (8) has unique maxima. Notice that (7) is an equation defined in terms of
conditional expectation. Conditional statements of this type are in general difficult to compute,
and the challenge is to state the result in terms of unconditional expectations.
In Appendix A we offer a complete solution to the general case where Dt is a function of
Rt, and Rt is a decision variable. In the general case the equilibria satisfy a set of non-linear
stochastic differential equations. Theorem 3.2.1 will be sufficient for many of the applications
we have in mind, however.
9
4 Explicit formulas for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
In this section we offer explicit formulas for the equilibria that occur when the demand rate is
given by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We first consider the case with constant coefficients,
and then extend the results to the case with time dependent, deterministic coefficients.
4.1 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with constant coefficients
In this section we assume that Dt is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with constant coefficients,
i.e., that
dDt = a(µ−Dt)dt+ σdBt (10)
where a, µ, σ are constants. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is important in many applications.
In particular it is commonly used as a model for the electricity market. The process is mean
reverting around the constant level µ, and the constant a decides the speed of mean reversion.
The explicit solution to (10) is
Dt = D0e−at + µ(1− e−at) +
∫ t
0
σea(s−t)dBs (11)
It is easy to see that
Dt = Dt−δe−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ) +
∫ t
t−δ
σea(s−t)dBs (12)
Using that the last term is independent of Et with a normal distribution N(0, σ
2(1−e−2aδ)
2a ), it is
possible to find a closed form solution to (7). We let G[z] denote the cumulative distribution of
a standard normal distribution, and G−1[z] its inverse. The final result can be stated as follows:
Proposition 4.1.1
For each y ∈ R, let Φy : [M,R]→ R denote the function
Φy[w] = ye−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ) + σ
√
1− e−2aδ
2a
·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]
(13)
and let Ψy : [M,R]→ R denote the function Ψy[w] = (w−M)Φy[w]. If Φy[M ] > 0, the function
Ψy is quasi-concave and has a unique maximum with a strictly positive function value.
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At time t− δ the parties should observe y = Dt−δ, and equilibrium is obtained at
w∗t =

Argmax[Ψy] if Φy[M ] > 0
M otherwise
q∗t =

Φy[Argmax[Ψy]] if Φy[M ] > 0
0 otherwise
(14)
Proof
See Appendix B. 
The condition Φy[M ] > 0 has an obvious interpretation. The manufacturer cannot offer a
wholesale price w lower than her production cost M . If Φy[M ] ≤ 0, it means that the retailer is
unable to make a positive expected profit even at the lowest wholesale price the manufacturer
can offer. When that occurs, the retailers best strategy is to order q = 0 units. When the
retailer orders q = 0 units, the choice of w is arbitrary. The choice w = M is, however, the only
strategy that is increasing and continuous in y.
Given values for the parameters a, µ, σ, S,M,R, and δ, the explicit expression in (13) makes
it straightforward to construct the deterministic function y 7→ Argmax[Ψy] numerically. Two
different graphs of this function are shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows the corresponding function
Φy[Argmax[Ψy]]. In the construction we used a delay δ = 7 and δ = 30, with the parameter
values
a = 0.05 µ = 100 σ = 12 R = 10 S = 1 M = 2 (15)
50 100 150 200 250 Dt-∆
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
wt
*
50 100 150 200 250 Dt-∆
5.5
6.0
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*
δ = 7 δ = 30
Figure 2: w∗t as a function of the observed demand rate D = Dt−δ
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Figure 3: q∗t as a function of the observed demand rate D = Dt−δ
Note that the manufacturing cost M = 2 is relatively low, and Φy[M ] > 0 is satisfied for all
y > 0 in these cases. It is interesting to note that the equilibria change considerably when the
delay increases from δ = 7 to δ = 30 (notice the scale on the y-axis).
4.2 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with variable coefficients
We now consider the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with variable, deterministic coefficients, i.e.,
the case
dDt = a(t)(µ(t)−Dt)dt+ σ(t)dBt (16)
where a(t), µ(t), σ(t) are given deterministic functions. The increased flexibility is important
in applications since it allows for scenarios where the mean reversion level µ can have a time
variable trend. When the coefficients are constant, the equilibria can be found by simple look-up
tables as the ones shown in Figure 2 and 3. Moreover, the look-up tables are the same for all
values of t. This is no longer true in the case with variable coefficients. The equilibria can still
be found from look-up tables, but these tables are in general different for different values of t.
The basic result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4.2.1
For each t ∈ [δ, T ], y ∈ R, let Φt,y : [M,R]→ R denote the function
Φt,y[w] = ye−
R t
t−δ a(s)ds + µˆ(t) + σˆ(t)G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]
(17)
where
µˆ(t) =
∫ t
t−δ
a(s)µ(s)e−
R t
s a(u)duds σˆ(t) =
√∫ t
t−δ
σ2(s)e−2
R t
s a(u)duds (18)
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and let Ψt,y : [M,R] → R denote the function Ψt,y[w] = (w −M)Φt,y[w]. If Φt,y[M ] > 0, the
function Ψt,y is quasi-convave and has a unique maximum with a strictly positive function value.
At time t− δ the parties should observe y = Dt−δ, and equilibrium is obtained at
w∗t =

Argmax[Ψt,y] if Φt,y[M ] > 0
M otherwise
q∗t =

Φt,y[Argmax[Ψt,y]] if Φt,y[M ] > 0
0 otherwise
(19)
Proof
See Appendix B. 
As in the constant coefficient case, these formulas are sufficiently explicit to make the model
operational. The unique values Argmax[Ψt,y] are easily found numerically, and look-up tables
similar to the ones shown in Figure 2 and 3 can be constructed for each fixed t.
5 Explicit formulas for geometric Brownian motion
In this section we offer explicit formulas for the equilibria that occur when the demand rate is
given by a geometric Brownian motion. We first consider the case with constant coefficients,
and then extend the results to the case with time dependent, deterministic coefficients.
While geometric Brownian motion is probably the most commonly used model for stock
prices, it is not necessarily an obvious choice to model a demand rate. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process is often the preferred choice allowing demand to fluctuate around a pre-determined
mean-reversion level. Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes can, however, take on negative values with
positive probability, and that problem never occurs with geometric Brownian motion. If we
model demand by a geometric Brownian motion, we are basically assuming that demand is
growing proportional to the size of the market. That assumption may be unreasonable in a
settled market, but can be attractive in modeling emerging markets with newly introduced
brands.
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5.1 Geometric Brownian motion with constant coefficients
In this section we assume that Dt is a geometric Brownian motion with constant coefficients,
i.e., that
dDt = aDtdt+ σDtdBt (20)
where a, σ are constants. The explicit solution to (20) is
Dt = D0 exp
[(
a− 1
2
σ2
)
t+ σBt
]
(21)
and it is easy to see that
Dt = Dt−δ exp
[(
a− 1
2
σ2
)
δ + σ(Bt −Bt−δ)
]
(22)
The explicit form of (22) makes it possible to write down a closed form solution to (7):
Proposition 5.1.1
Let Φ : [M,R]→ R denote the function
Φ[w] = exp
[
(a− 1
2
σ2)δ +
√
δσ2 ·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]
(23)
and let Ψ : [M,R] → R denote the function Ψ[w] = (w −M)Φ[w]. The function Ψ is quasi-
concave and has a unique maximum with a strictly positive function value.
At time t− δ the retailer should observe y = Dt−δ, and equilibrium is obtained at
w∗t = Argmax[Ψ] (constant) q
∗
t = y · Φ[Argmax[Ψ]] (24)
Proof
See Appendix B. 
We see that the solution is quite different from the case with the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
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In this case the manufacturer has an equilibrium price that is constant and need not observe
the demand rate to decide her price. The retailer should order a fixed fraction of the observed
demand rate at time t− δ.
5.2 Geometric Brownian motion with variable coefficients
In this section we assume that Dt is a geometric Brownian motion with variable deterministic
coefficients, i.e., that
dDt = a(t)Dtdt+ σ(t)DtdBt (25)
where a(t), σ(t) are given deterministic functions. The increased flexibility is of course attractive
in modeling, but like in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck case, the solution is more complicated.
Proposition 5.2.1
For t ∈ [δ, T ], let Φt : [M,R]→ R denote the function
Φt[w] = exp
[
aˆ(t) + σˆ(t) ·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]
(26)
where
aˆ(t) =
∫ t
t−δ
a(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)ds σˆ(s) =
√∫ t
t−δ
σ2(s)dt (27)
and let Ψt : [M,R]→ R denote the function Ψt[w] = (w −M)Φt[w]. The function Ψt is quasi-
concave and has a unique maximum with a strictly positive function value.
At time t− δ the retailer should observe y = Dt−δ, and equilibrium is obtained at
w∗t = Argmax[Ψt] q
∗
t = y · Φt[Argmax[Ψt]] (28)
Proof
See Appendix B. 
If we compare with the case with constant coefficients, we see that the wholesale price w is no
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longer constant. Nevertheless we see that the equilibria are defined in terms of two deterministic
functions Argmax[Ψt] and Φt[Argmax[Ψt]]. The values for these functions are easily computed
numerically. To illustrate how this works, we used the parameter values
R = 10, S = 1,M = 2, δ = 7
together with the coefficients
a(t) = 0.02 (constant) σ(t) = 0.075 · (e−0.05 t + 1) (29)
Graphs for the functions Argmax[Ψt] and Φt[Argmax[Ψt]] are shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium prices and fractions for geometric Brownian motion
The dotted line shows the corresponding equilibrium price and fraction for the constant coeffi-
cient case with
a = 0.02 σ = 0.075 (30)
5.3 Geometric Le´vy processes with ω dependent coefficients
In this subsection we handle geometric Le´vy processes where one of the coefficients is ω de-
pendent. This case is important since it focuses some general problems, and also provide some
hints on how to address even more general cases. A geometric Le´vy process is a solution of a
stochastic differential equation of the form
dD(t) = D(t−)
(
a(t, ω)dt+ σ(t, ω)dBt +
∫
R
γ(t, z, ω)N˜(dt, dz)
)
(31)
In this equation Bt is Brownian motion and N˜ denotes a compensated Poisson random mea-
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sure, see Øksendal and Sulem (2007) for an introduction to stochastic calculus based on Le´vy
processes. If we assume that D(0) = D0 > 0 and γ(t, z) ≥ −1, the solution satisfies Dt ≥ 0
for all t. The model in (31) is widely accepted as a good model for prices of financial assets.
The positivity property Dt ≥ 0 for all t, makes it suitable as a model for demand as well. If
γ(t, z, ω) ∈ [−1, 0] for all (t, z, ω), this corresponds to a situation with market corrections, i.e., at
random times demand is adjusted to a fraction of its previous value. This is an attractive way
to negate the exponential growth of geometric Brownian motion, keeping demand from growing
without limit.
The explicit solution of (31) is
Dt = D0 exp
[∫ t
0
(
a(s, ω)− 1
2
σ2(s, ω) +
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z, ω)]− γ(s, z, ω)ν(dz)
)
ds (32)
+
∫ t
0
σ(s, ω)dBs +
∫ t
0
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z, ω)]N˜(ds, dz)
]
Now assume that
a(s, ω) = Bs(ω) σ(s, ω) = σ(s) γ(s, z, ω) = γ(s, z) (33)
i.e., that σ and γ are given deterministic functions, while the growth-rate a(s, ω) is depending
om ω as well as t. The expression in (32) is sufficiently explicit to admit a fair description of the
functions we need to solve to find Stackelberg equilibria. This description can be formulated as
follows:
For each fixed t, consider the random variable Xt given by
Xt = exp
[
δBt−δ + t(Bt −Bt−δ)−
∫ t
t−δ
sdBs
+
∫ t
t−δ
(
−1
2
σ2(s) +
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z)]− γ(s, z)ν(dz)
)
ds (34)
+
∫ t
t−δ
σ(s)dBs +
∫ t
t−δ
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z)]N˜(ds, dz)
]
Let Ft denote the cumulative distribution of Xt, and for each fixed t let F−1t denote the inverse
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function of Ft. Consider for each t ∈ [δ, T ], the functions
Φt[w] = F−1t
[
1− w − S
R− S
]
Ψt[w] = (w −M)Φt[w] (35)
At time t − δ the retailer should observe both the demand rate y = Dt−δ and the growth
rate a = Bt−δ, and equilibrium is obtained at
w∗t = Argmax[Ψt] q
∗
t = y · eδa · Φt[Argmax[Ψt]] (36)
For a derivation of these results see Appendix B. We notice that the structure of the solution
is quite similar to the case covered in Proposition 5.2.1. The manufacturer has a pricing strategy
defined in terms of a deterministic function. The retailer should observe the demand rate, adjust
it by the observed growth rate, and multiply the adjusted number by a deterministic fraction.
A problem here is that the random variable in (34) is terribly complicated leaving little hope
of an analytic proof of a unique maximum. Apart from that, the expressions can still be handled
numerically, and maxima can be verified by visual inspection.
6 Numerical examples for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
In this section we will compare the performance of the dynamic approach with a scenario where
the retailer believes that demand has a constant distribution D. A constant coefficient Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process
Dt = D0e−at + µ(1− e−at) + σe−at ·
∫ t
0
easdBs (37)
is ergodic in the sense that observations along any sample path will approach the distribution
N(µ, σ
2
2a ). Assuming that the retailer believes that the demand rate has a static distribution
D and that he has observed the demand rate a fair amount of time prior to ordering, he will
hence conclude that D is N(µ, σ
2
2a ). If the manufacturer knows that the retailer will make orders
according to a static N(µ, σ
2
2a ) distribution, she can compute a fixed value for w which optimizes
her expected profit.
To examine the performance of the dynamic and the static approch, we sampled paths of
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the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process using the parameters
µ = 100 σ = 12 a = 0.05 D0 = 100 (38)
One such sample path was shown in Figure 1. Values for the accumulated profits
∫ T
δ
(R− S) min[Dt, qt]− (wt − S)qtdt
∫ T
δ
(wt −M)qtdt (39)
were computed for different values of δ using the values
R = 10 M = 2 S = 1 T = 100 + δ (40)
and using 4 different strategies:
• Dynamic approach as defined by Proposition 4.1.1.
• Static approach as defined above.
• Dynamic cooperative approach using wt = M .
• Static cooperative approach using wt = M .
We assume that sales takes place in time intervals [δ, 100 + δ]. The length of the sales period
hence is 100 regardless of the value on δ. This makes it easier to compare performance using
different values of δ. The results were averaged over 1000 sample paths and these averages are
reported in the tables below.
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Table 1: Performance of dynamic versus static strategies. Delay δ = 1.
Values over 1000 sample paths Manufacturer Retailer Supply chain
Average profit static approach 42 830 12 729 55 559
Average profit dynamic approach 61 356 4 073 65 429
Average profit static cooporation - - 73 251
Average profit dynamic cooporation - - 77 766
Table 2: Performance of dynamic versus static strategies. Delay δ = 7.
Values over 1000 sample paths Manufacturer Retailer Supply chain
Average profit static approach 42 830 12 457 55 286
Average profit dynamic approach 48 592 9 438 58 030
Average profit static cooporation - - 73 029
Average profit dynamic cooporation - - 74 838
Table 3: Performance of dynamic versus static strategies. Delay δ = 30.
Values over 1000 sample paths Manufacturer Retailer Supply chain
Average profit static approach 42 830 12 074 54 903
Average profit dynamic approach 43 225 11 882 55 106
Average profit static cooporation - - 72 648
Average profit dynamic cooporation - - 72 794
As we can see from these tables, the dynamic approach is favorable for the manufacturer,
and more favorable the shorter the delay. At δ = 30 the effect of the dynamic approach is close
to being wiped out. The same results apply for the supply chain, i.e., a dynamic approach offers
improved profits and the improvement is bigger when the delay is shorter. It is interesting to
note, however, that the retailer has a distinct disadvantage of the dynamic approach and that
this disadvantage is bigger the shorter the delay.
In a cooperative setting a dynamic approach can be favorable for both the retailer and the
manufacturer. Profits can be shared leading to an improved position for both parties. In a
non-cooperative equilibrium more precise information can be a disadvantage for the retailer.
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This is due to the Stackelberg structure of the game. With more precise information, the leader
is in more control and can take a bigger share of the profits. In the limit δ → 0, the leader is in
full control. The retailer will then order the observed demand rate no matter what the price is.
The manufacturer offers a price marginally close to R taking all profit in the limit.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has two main topics. First we develop a new theory for stochastic differential Stack-
elberg games and apply that theory to continuous time newsvendor problems. Second we make
our theory operational by providing explicit solution formulas for important special cases.
In the continuous time newsvendor problem we offer a full description of the general case
where our stochastic demand rate Dt is a function of the retail price Rt. The wholesale price
wt and the order rate qt are decided based on information present at time t− δ, while the retail
price can in general be decided later, i.e., at time t − δR where δ > δR. This problem can be
solved using Theorem A.2 in the appendix. The solution is defined in terms of a coupled system
of stochastic differential equations, however, and admittedly such systems are very hard to solve.
To be able to solve our problem in terms of explicit expressions, we need to consider the
simplified case where Rt is exogenously given and fixed. We offer closed form solutions for the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process and Geometric Brownian motion both with time-variable, deter-
ministic coefficients. We also offer formulas for a Geometric Le´vy process, i.e., a process with
jumps. Although we do not state that result explicitly, the discussion in Subsection 5.3 really
shows how to solve all cases where the Geometric Le´vy process has time-variable, deterministic
coefficients.
From an applied point of view we believe that the numerical results in Section 6 are of general
interest. We demonstrate that the retailer suffers a distinct disadvantage of more information,
and that this disadvantage is bigger the more precise the information is. Such issues may have
important political implications, in particular in electricity markets, and we believe that our
model may offer new insights into the mechanisms governing equilibria in such markets.
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8 Appendix A
In this appendix we offer a full discussion and complete proofs for general stochastic Stackelberg
games. To improve readability we repeat some definitions given in the main body of the paper.
We will assume that the state of the system is given by a controlled jump diffusion on the form:
dXt = µ(t,Xt, u(t), ω)dt+ σ(t,Xt, u(t), ω)dBt
+
∫
R
γ(t,Xt, u(t), ξ, ω)N˜(dt, dξ) (41)
X(0) = x ∈ R
where the coefficients µ(t, x, u, ω) : [0, T ]×R×U×Ω→ R, σ(t, x, u, ω) : [0, T ]×R×U×Ω→ R,
γ(t, x, u, ξ, ω) : [0, T ] × R × U × R0 × Ω → R are given continuous functions assumed to be
continuously differentiable with respect to x and u, and R0 = R\{0}. Here Bt = B(t, ω); (t, ω) ∈
[0,∞) × Ω is a Brownian motion and N˜(dt, dξ) = N˜(dt, dξ, ω) is an independent compensated
Poisson random measure on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ). See Øksendal and
Sulem (2005) for more information about controlled jump diffusions. The set U = U1 × U2 is a
given set of admissible control values u(t, ω). We assume that the control u = u(t, ω) consists
of two components, u = (u1, u2), where Player 1 controls u1 and Player 2 controls u2. We also
assume that the information flows available to the players are given filtrations {E(1)t }t∈[0,T ] for
control u1 and control u
(1)
2 and {E(2)t }t∈[0,T ] for control u(2)2 , where u2 = (u(1)2 , u(2)2 ) and
E(1)t ⊆ E(2)t ⊆ Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ]. (42)
For example, the case much studied in this paper is when
E(1)t = E(2)t = Ft−δ for all t ∈ [δ, T ]. (43)
for some fixed information delay δ > 0. We assume that u1(t) and u
(1)
2 (t) are E(1)t -predictable,
and that u(2)2 (t) is E(2)t -predictable. Hence we assume there are three given families A(1)E ,A(2,1)E
andA(2,2)E of admissable controls u1, u(1)2 , u(2)2 , contained in the set of E(1)t , E(1)t and E(2)t -predictable
processes, respectively, and we put
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AE = A(1)E ×A(2)E where A(2)E = A(2,1)E ×A(2,2)E (44)
If a control u = (u1, u2) ∈ AE is chosen, the performance for Player i is assumed to be of the
form
Ji(u) = E
[∫ T
0
fi(t,Xt, u(t))dt+ gi(XT )
]
i = 1, 2 (45)
where fi(t, x, u) : [0, T ] × R × U → R and gi(x) : R → R are given profit rates and bequest
functions, respectively, assumed to be C1 with respect to x and u.
We now consider the following game theoretic situation:
Suppose Player 1 decides her control process u1 ∈ A(1)E . At any time t the value is immedi-
ately known to Player 2. Therefore he chooses u2 = u∗2 ∈ A(2)E such that
u2 7→ J2(u1, u2) is maximal for u2 = u∗2. (46)
Assume the there exists a measurable map Φ : A(1)E → A(2)E (a “maximizer” map) such that
u2 7→ J2(u1, u2) is maximal for u2 = u∗2 = Φ(u1) (47)
Player 1 knows that Player 2 will act in this rational way. Therefore Player 1 will choose
u1 = u∗1 ∈ A(1)E such that
u1 7→ J1(u1,Φ(u1)) is maximal for u1 = u∗1. (48)
The control u∗ := (u∗1,Φ(u∗1)) ∈ A(1)E × A(2)E is called a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game
defined by (41)-(45). In the newsvendor problem studied in this paper Player 1 is the manufac-
turer who decides the wholesale price u1 = w for the retailer, who is Player 2, and who decides
the order rate u(1)2 = q and the retailer price u
(2)
2 = R. Thus u2 = (q,R). We may summarize
(46) and (48) as follows:
max
u2∈A(2)E
J2(u1, u2) = J2(u1,Φ(u1)) (49)
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and
max
u1∈A(1)E
J1(u1,Φ(u1)) = J2(u∗1,Φ(u
∗
1)) (50)
We see that (49) and (50) constitute two consequtive stochastic control problems with partial
information, and hence we can use the maximum principle for such problems (see, e.g., Framstad
et. al (2004) and Baghery and Øksendal (2007)) to find a maximum principle for Stackelberg
equilibria. To this end, define the HamiltonianH2(t, x, u, a2, b2, c2(·)) : [0, T ]×R×U×R×R×R →
R by
H2(t, x, u, a2, b2, c2(·)) = f2(t, x, u) + µ(t, x, u)a2 + σ(t, x, u)b2 (51)
+
∫
R
γ(t, x, u, ξ)c2(ξ)ν(dξ);
where R is the set of functions c(·) : R0 → R such that (51) converges. The adjoint equation for
H2 in the unknown adjoint processes a2(t), b2(t), and c2(t, ξ) is the following backward stochastic
differential equation (BSDE):
da2(t) = −∂H2
∂x
(t,X(t), u(t), a2(t), b2(t), c2(t, ·))dt (52)
+ b2(t)dBt +
∫
R
c2(t, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
a2(T ) = g′2(X(T )) (53)
Here X(t) = Xu(t) is the solution to (2) corresponding to the control u ∈ AE . Next, for a given
map φ : R→ R define the Hamiltonian Hφ1 (t, x, u1, a1, b1, c1(·)) : [0, T ]×R×U1×R×R×R → R
by
Hφ1 (t, x, u1, a1, b1, c1(·)) = f1(t, x, u1, φ(u1)) + µ(t, x, u1, φ(u1))a1 (54)
+ σ(t, x, u1, φ(u1))b1 +
∫
R
γ(t, x, u1, φ(u1), ξ)c1(ξ)ν(dξ)
The adjoint equation (for Hφ1 ) in the unknown processes a1(t), b1(t), c1(t, ξ) is the following
BSDE:
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da1(t) = −∂H
φ
1
∂x
(t,X(t), u1(t), φ(u1(t)), a1(t), b1(t), c1(t, ·))dt (55)
+ b1(t)dBt +
∫
R
c1(t, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); 0 ≤ t ≤ T
a1(T ) = g′1(X(T )) (56)
HereX(t) = Xu1,φ(u1)(t) is the solution to (41) corresponding to the control u(t) := (u1(t), φ(u1(t)));
t ∈ [0, T ], assuming that this is admissible.
We can now formulate our maximum principle for Stackelberg equilibria:
Theorem A.1 (Sufficient maximum principle)
i) Suppose the following bullet points hold:
• H2(t, x, u1, u2, a2, b2, c2(·)) is concave with respect to x and u2, for each t, u1, a2, b2, c2(·).
• g2(x) is concave.
• There exists a function φ = φ(u1) = φ(u1, t, ω) : U1 × [0, T ] × Ω → U2 such that for all
u1 ∈ A(1)E ,
max
v2∈U2
E
[
H2(t, X˜(t), u1(t), v2, a˜2(t), b˜2(t), c˜2(t, ·))
∣∣E(2,j)t ] (57)
= E
[
H2(t, X˜(t), u1(t), φ(u1(t)), a˜2(t), b˜2(t), c˜2(t, ·))
∣∣E(2,j)t ] ; j = 1, 2
where X˜(t) = Xu1,φ(u1)(t) and (a˜2, b˜2, c˜2) is the solution of (52)-(53) corresponding to
u = (u1, φ(u1)).
•
E
[∫ T
0
(X˜(t)−Xu(t))2
(
b˜22(t) +
∫
R
c˜22(t, ξ)ν(dξ)
)
dt (58)
+
∫ T
0
a˜22(t)
(
σ2(t,Xu(t), u(t)) +
∫
R
γ2(t,Xu(t), u(t), ξ)ν(dξ)
)
dt
]
<∞
for all u = (u1, u2) ∈ AE .
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Define
(Φ(u1))(t, ω) = φ(u1(t, ω)); u1 ∈ A(1)E (59)
Suppose Φ(u1) ∈ A(2)E . Then
max
u2∈A(2)E
J2(u1, u2) = J2(u1,Φ(u1)); u1 ∈ A(1)E (60)
ii) With φ as in i), assume in addition that the following bullet points hold:
• Hφ1 (t, x, u1, a1, b1, c1(·)) is concave with respect to x and u1, for all t, a1, b1, c1(·).
• g1(x) is concave.
• There exist u∗1 ∈ A(1)E such that
max
v1∈U1
E
[
Hφ1 (t, Xˆ(t), v1, aˆ2(t), bˆ2(t), cˆ2(t, ·))
∣∣E(1)t ] (61)
= E
[
Hφ1 (t, Xˆ(t), u
∗
1(t), aˆ2(t), bˆ2(t), cˆ2(t, ·))
∣∣E(1)t ]
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. Here Xˆ(t) = Xu∗1,φ(u∗1)(t) and aˆ1(t), bˆ1(t), cˆ1(t, ·) is the solution of
(55)-(56) corresponding to u1 = u∗1.
•
E
[∫ T
0
(Xˆ(t)−Xu1,φ(u1)(t))2
(
bˆ21(t) +
∫
R
cˆ21(t, ξ)ν(dξ)
)
dt (62)
+
∫ T
0
aˆ21(t)
(
σ2(t,Xu1,φ(u1)(t), u1(t), φ(u1(t)))
+
∫
R
γ2(t,Xu1,φ(u1)(t), u1(t), φ(u1(t)), ξ)ν(dξ)
)
dt
]
<∞
for all u1 ∈ A(1)E .
Then (u∗1,Φ(u∗1)) ∈ A(1)E ×A(2)E is a Stackelberg equilibrium for the game.
Proof
Part i) is proved by applying the maximum principle for optimal stochastic control with respect
to u2 ∈ A(2)E of the state process Xu1,u2(t) for fixed u1 ∈ A(1)E , as presented in Baghery and
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Øksendal (2007). See also Framstad et. al (2004), Øksendal and Sulem (2007). Similarly, part
ii) is proved by applying the same maximum principle for optimal stochastic control with respect
to u1 ∈ A(1)E of the state process Xu1,φ(u1)(t), for the given function φ.

8.1 Applications to the newsvendor problem
We now apply our general result for stochastic Stackelberg games to the newsvendor problem.
In the newsvendor problem we have the control u = (u1, u2) where u1 = w is the wholesale
price, and u2 = (q,R) with q the order rate and R the retail price. Moreover Xt = Dt,
f1(t,X(t), u(t)) = (wt −M)qt, g1 = 0, (63)
f2(t,X(t), u(t)) = (Rt − S) min(Dt, qt)− (wt − S)qt, and g2 = 0. (64)
Therefore by (51)
H2(t,Dt, qt, Rt, wt, a2, b2, c2(·)) = (Rt − S) min(Dt, qt)− (wt − S)qt (65)
+ a2(t)µ(t,Dt, Rt) + b2(t)σ(t,Dt, Rt)
+
∫
R
γ(t,Dt, Rt, ξ)c2(ξ)ν(dξ)
Similarly by (54) , with u2 = φ(u1) = (φ1(w), φ2(w)) = (q(w), R(w))
Hφ1 (t,Dt, wt, a1(t), b1(t), c1(t, ·)) (66)
=(wt −M)φ1(wt) + a1(t)µ(t,Dt, φ2(wt)) + b1(t)σ(t,Dt, φ2(wt)) (67)
+
∫
R
c1(t, ξ)γ(t,Dt, φ2(wt), ξ)ν(dξ) (68)
Here we have assumed that the dynamics of Dt only depends on the control Rt = φ2(wt) and
has the general form
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dDt = µ(t,Dt, Rt)dt+ σ(t,Dt, Rt)dBt (69)
+
∫
R
γ(t,Dt, Rt, ξ)N˜(dt, dξ); t ∈ [0, T ]
D0 = d0 ∈ R (70)
To find a Stackelberg equilibrium we use Theorem A.1. Hence by (57) we first maximize
E
[
H2(t,Dt, qt, Rt, wt, a2(t), b2(t), c2(t, ·))
∣∣E(2;j)t ] (71)
with respect to u(j)2 , j = 1, 2, where u
(1)
2 = q, u
(2)
2 = R. The first order conditions give the
equations
E
[
(Rˆt − S)X[0,Dt](qˆt)− wt + S
∣∣E(2,1)t ] = 0 (72)
and
E
[
min(Dt, qˆt) + a2(t)
∂µ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rˆ) (73)
+b2(t)
∂σ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rˆ) +
∫
R
c2(t, ξ)
∂γ
∂R
(t,Dt, Rˆ, ξ)ν(dξ)
∣∣∣E(2,2)t ] = 0
for the optimal values qˆt, Rˆt. Let qˆt = φ1(wt), Rˆt = φ2(wt) be the solution of this coupled system.
Next, by (61) we maximize
E
[
Hφ1 (t, Dˆt, wt, a1(t), b1(t), c1(t, ·))
∣∣E(1)t ] (74)
=E
[
(wt −M)φ1(wt) + a1(t)µ(t,Dt, φ2(wt))
+b1(t)σ(t,Dt, φ2(wt)) +
∫
R
c1(t, ξ)γ(t,Dt, φ2(wt), ξ)ν(dξ)
∣∣∣E(1)t ]
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with respect to wt. This gives the first order condition
(wˆt −M)φ′1(wˆ) + φ1(wˆt) + φ′2(wˆ)E
[
a1(t)
∂µ
∂R
(t,Dt, φ2(wˆt)) (75)
+b1(t)
∂σ
∂R
(t,Dt, φ2(wˆt)) +
∫
R
c1(t, ξ)
∂γ
∂R
(t,Dt, φ2(wˆt), ξ)ν(dξ)
∣∣∣E(1)t ] = 0
for the optimal value wˆt. The processes ai(t), bi(t), ci(t, ξ) are given by (52)-(53) for i = 2 and
(55)-(56) for i = 1.
We summarize what we have proved in the following theorem.
Theorem A.2
Let qˆt = φ1(wt), Rˆt = φ2(wt) be the optimizers of (71). Assume that φi ∈ C1 and that the
conditions of Theorem A.1 are satisfied. Let wˆt be the optimizer of (74). Suppose
u∗ = (wˆt, (φ1(wˆt), φ2(wˆt))) ∈ A(1)E ×A(2)E
Then u∗ is a Stackelberg equilibrium for the newsvendor problem with state Xt = Dt given by
(69) and performance functionals
J1(w, (q,R)) = E
[∫ T
δ
(wt −M)qtdt
]
(manufacturer’s profit) (76)
J2(w, (q,R)) = E
[∫ T
δ
(
(Rt − S) min(Dt, qt)− (wt − S)qt
)
dt
]
(retailer’s profit) (77)
In other words
max
(q,R)∈A(2)E
{J2(w, (q,R))} = J2(w, (φ1(w), φ2(w))) (78)
and
max
w∈A(1)E
{J1(w, (φ1(w), φ2(w)))} = J1(wˆ, (φ1(wˆ), φ2(wˆ))) (79)
Remark
Note that if R is fixed and cannot be chosen by the retailer, then (73) is irrelevant and we are
left with (72) leading to the much simpler equations that we reported in Theorem 3.2.1.
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9 Appendix B
In this appendix we give complete proofs for all unproved statements given in Section 4 and 5.
We start with a non-trivial estimate for the standard normal distribution, which will be crucial
in the proofs of unique maxima.
Lemma B.1
In this lemma G[x] is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Let 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, and for each m consider the function hm : R→ R defined by
hm[z] = z(1−m−G[z])−G′[z] (80)
Then
hm[z] < 0 for all z ∈ R (81)
Proof
Note that if z ≥ 0, then hm[z] ≤ h0[z] and if z ≤ 0, then hm[z] ≤ h1[z]. It hence suffices
to prove the lemma for m = 0 and m = 1. Using G′′[z] = −x · G′[z], it is easy to see that
h′′m[z] = −G′[z] ≤ 0. If m = 0, it is straightforward to check that h0 is strictly increasing, and
that limz→+∞ h0[z] = 0. If m = 1, it is straightforward to check that h1[z] is strictly decreasing,
and that limz→−∞ h1[z] = 0. This proves that h0 and h1 are strictly negative, completing the
proof of the lemma.
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Details for Proposition 4.1.1
From (12), we easily see that the statement qt ≤ Dt is equivalent to the inequality
qt −
(
Dt−δe−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ
)
≤
∫ t
t−δ
σea(s−t)dBs (82)
The left hand side is Et-measurable, while the right hand side is normally distributed and
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independent of Et. Using the Itoˆ isometry, we see that the right hand side has expected value
zero and variance σ
2(1−e−2aδ)
2a . It is then straightforward to see that
E
[X[0,Dt](qˆt)|Et] = 1−G
qt − (Dt−δe−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ))√
σ2(1−e−2aδ)
2a
 (83)
and (13) follows trivially from (9). It remains to prove that the function Ψy has a unique
maximum if Φy[M ] > 0. First put
yˆ =
y · e−aδ + µ(1− e−aδ)
σ
√
1−e−2aδ
2a
(84)
and note that Ψy is proportional to
(w −M)
(
yˆ +G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
])
(85)
We make a monotone change of variables using z = G−1
[
1− w−SR−S
]
. With this change of
variables we get that Ψy is proportional to
(R− S)
(
1−G[z]− M − S
R− S
)
(yˆ + z) (86)
Put m = M−SR−S , and note that Ψy is proportional to
(1−m−G[z])(yˆ + z) (87)
Φy[M ] > 0 is equivalent to yˆ + G−1[1 − m] > 0, and the condition w ≥ M is equivalent to
z ≤ G−1[1 −m]. Note that if S ≤ M ≤ R, then 0 ≤ m ≤ 1. For each fixed 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, yˆ ∈ R
consider the function
fm[z] = (1−m−G[z])(yˆ + z) on the interval − yˆ ≤ z ≤ G−1[1−m] (88)
If yˆ +G−1[1−m] > 0, the interval is non-degenerate and non-empty, and
f ′m[z] = −G′[z](yˆ + z) + (1−m−G[z]) (89)
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Note that f ′m[−yˆ] > 0, and that fm[−yˆ] = fm[G−1[1 − m]] = 0. These functions hence have
at least one strictly positive maximum. To prove that the maximum is unique, assume that
f ′m[z0] = 0, and compute f ′′m[z0]. Using G′′[z] = −z · g′[z], it follows that
f ′′m[z0] = z0(1−m−G[z0])− 2G′[z0] < z0(1−m−G[z0])−G′[z0] < 0 (90)
by Lemma B.1. The function is hence quasi-concave and has a unique, strictly positive maxi-
mum. That completes the proof of Proposition 4.1.1.

Details for Proposition 4.2.1
In this case the statement qt ≤ Dt is equivalent to the inequality
qt −
(
Dt−δe−
R t
t−δ a(u)du +
∫ t
t−δ
a(s)µ(s)e−
R t
t−δ a(u)du
)
≤
∫ t
t−δ
σ(s)e−
R t
t−δ a(u)dudBs (91)
Again the left hand side is Et-measurable, while the right hand side is normally distributed and
independent of Et. The calculations in the proof of Proposition 4.1.1 can be repeated line by
line for each fixed value of t, proving the general case in Proposition 4.2.1.

Details for Proposition 5.1.1
From (22), we easily see that the statement qt ≤ Dt is equivalent to the inequality
ln
[
qt
Dt−δ
]
− (a− 1
2
σ2)δ ≤ σ(Bt −Bt−δ) (92)
The left hand side is Et-measurable, while the right hand side is normally distributed and
independent of Et. It is then straightforward to prove that
E
[X[0,Dt](qˆt)|Et] = 1−G
 ln
[
qt
Dt−δ
]
− (a− 12σ2)δ√
σ2δ
 (93)
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Hence it follows from (9) that
qt = Dt−δ · exp
[
(a− 1
2
σ2)δ +
√
δσ2 ·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]
(94)
With this order quantity, the expected profit for the manufacturer is
E[Dt−δ · (wt −M) exp
[
(a− 1
2
σ2)δ +
√
δσ2 ·G−1
[
1− wt − S
R− S
]]
(95)
In general wt can be a random variable. If w∗ = Argmax[Ψ], where
Ψ[w] = (w −M) exp
[
(a− 1
2
σ2)δ +
√
δσ2 ·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]
(96)
we have, however, that
E
[
Dt−δ · (wt −M) exp
[
(a− 1
2
σ2)δ +
√
δσ2 ·G−1
[
1− wt − S
R− S
]]]
≤ E[Dt−δ] ·Ψ[w∗] (97)
with equality if wt = w∗. Hence w∗ is optimal. It remains to prove that Argmax[Ψ] is unique.
If we put b =
√
δσ2, it follows that Ψ is proportional to a function of the form
w 7→ (w −M) exp
[
bG−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]
(98)
where b > 0. Make a monotone change of variables using z = G−1
[
1− w−SR−S
]
. With this change
of variables we get that Ψ is proportional to
(R− S)
(
1−G[z]− M − S
R− S
)
exp[b z] (99)
Put m = M−SR−S , and note that Ψ is proportional to a function
(1−m−G[z]) exp[b z] (100)
For each fixed 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, b > 0 consider the function
fm[z] = (1−m−G[z]) exp[b z] on the interval −∞ < z ≤ G−1[1−m] (101)
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We have
f ′m[z] = −G′[z] exp[b z] + (1−m−G[z])b exp[b z] (102)
Note that limz→−∞ fm[z] = 0, fm[G−1[1−m]] = 0, and f ′m[G−1[1−m]] < 0. The function hence
has at least one strictly positive maximum. To see that the maximum is unique, find z0 s.t.
f ′m[z0] = 0. Using G′′[z] = −z ·G′[z], we can simplify the expression to get
f ′′m[z0] = (z0 − b)G′[z0] exp[b z] (103)
From Lemma B.1 and f ′m[z0] = 0 we get
(1−m−G[z0])b = G′[z0] > (1−m−G[z0])z0 (104)
Hence if f ′m[z0] = 0, we must have z0 < b, which implies f ′′m[z0] < 0. The function is hence quasi-
concave and has a unique, strictly positive maximum. That completes the proof of Proposition
5.1.1.

Details for Proposition 5.2.1
In the case with variable coefficients, we have
Dt = Dt−δ · exp
[∫ t
t−δ
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)ds+
∫ t
t−δ
σ(s)dBs
]
(105)
Put
µˆ(t) =
∫ t
t−δ
µ(s)− 1
2
σ2(s)ds σˆ2(s) =
∫ t
t−δ
σ2(s)ds (106)
Since the exponent in (105) is normally distributed and independent of Et, we get
E
[X[0,Dt](qˆt)|Et] = 1−G
 ln
[
qt
Dt−δ
]
− µˆ(t)
σˆ(t)
 (107)
Hence it follows from (9) that
qt = Dt−δ · exp
[
µˆ(t) + σˆ(t) ·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]
(108)
34
With this order quantity, the expected profit for the manufacturer is
E
[
Dt−δ · (wt −M) exp
[
µˆ(t) + σˆ(t) ·G−1
[
1− w − S
R− S
]]]
(109)
The calculations in the proof of Proposition 5.1.1 can now be repeated line by line for each fixed
t proving the general case in Proposition 5.2.1. 
Details for subsection 5.3
From (32) it follows that
Dt = Dt−δ exp
[∫ t
t−δ
(
Bs(ω)− 12σ
2(s) +
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z)]− γ(s, z)ν(dz)
)
ds (110)
+
∫ t
t−δ
σ(s)dBs +
∫ t
t−δ
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z)]N˜(ds, dz)
]
= Dt−δ · exp
[∫ t
t−δ
Bs(ω)ds
]
(111)
· exp
[∫ t
t−δ
(
−1
2
σ2(s) +
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z)]− γ(s, z)ν(dz)
)
ds (112)
+
∫ t
t−δ
σ(s)dBs +
∫ t
t−δ
∫
R0
log[1 + γ(s, z)]N˜(ds, dz)
]
The problem here is the second term exp
[∫ t
t−δ Bs(ω)ds
]
which is not independent of Et. Integrate
by parts to see that
exp
[∫ t
t−δ
Bs(ω)ds
]
= exp
[
δBt−δ + t(Bt −Bt−δ)−
∫ t
t−δ
sdBs
]
(113)
from which it follows that
Dt = Dt−δ · exp [δBt−δ] ·Xt (114)
where Xt is given by (34). Here the first two terms are Et-measurable, while the last term is
independent of Et. It is then straightforward to see that (35) follows from (9).

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